Climate policy commitment devices
| Autor: | Sebastian Dengler, Gijs van de Kuilen, Reyer Gerlagh, Stefan T. Trautmann |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | TILT, Department of Economics, Research Group: Economics, Tilburg Sustainability Center |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Commitment device
Economics and Econometrics Record locking 05 social sciences Global warming Climate change ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING experiments Management Monitoring Policy and Law Environmental economics Climate policy Social preferences Natural resource climate change 0502 economics and business Economics climate policy instruments 050202 agricultural economics & policy 050207 economics Baseline (configuration management) Energy source intertemporal cooperation |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 92, 331-343. ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE |
| ISSN: | 0095-0696 |
| Popis: | We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a ‘libertarian’ baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a costly commitment device or reduce climate threshold uncertainty reduce resource extraction. We also study two conditions to assess the underlying social preferences and the viability of ecological dictatorship. Our results suggest that climate-change policies that focus on investments that lock the economy into carbon-free energy sources provide an important commitment device in the intertemporal cooperation problem. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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