Strategy-proof and non-wasteful multi-unit auction via social network
| Autor: | Seiji Takanashi, Nathanaël Barrot, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, Takehiro Kawasaki |
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| Předmět: |
FOS: Computer and information sciences
Mechanism design Social network Computer science business.industry TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Rationality General Medicine Economic surplus Microeconomics FOS: Economics and business Incentive Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Economics - Theoretical Economics Revenue Common value auction ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDSOCIETY Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) business Mechanism (sociology) Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) |
| Zdroj: | Scopus-Elsevier AAAI |
| Popis: | Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness, non-deficit, non-wastefulness, and individual rationality for the multi-unit unit-demand auction, except for some naïve ones. In this paper, we first propose a mechanism that satisfies all the above properties. We then make a comprehensive comparison with two naïve mechanisms, showing that the proposed mechanism dominates them in social surplus, seller's revenue, and incentive of buyers for truth-telling. We also analyze the characteristics of the social surplus and the revenue achieved by the proposed mechanism, including the constant approximability of the worst-case efficiency loss and the complexity of optimizing revenue from the seller's perspective. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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