The sources of shareholder wealth gains from going private transactions: The role of controlling shareholders
Autor: | Alexis Cellier, Sabri Boubaker, Wael Rouatbi |
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Přispěvatelé: | Institut de Recherche en Gestion (IRG), Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée (UPEM)-Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12 (UPEC UP12), Boubaker, Sabri |
Jazyk: | angličtina |
Rok vydání: | 2014 |
Předmět: |
[QFIN.GN] Quantitative Finance [q-fin]/General Finance [q-fin.GN]
Finance [QFIN.GN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin]/General Finance [q-fin.GN] Economics and Econometrics Corporate governance business.industry Control (management) Wealth gains Monetary economics IRG_AXE1 jel:G34 jel:G32 Going private Private benefits of control Abnormal return Shareholder Agency (sociology) Value (economics) Economics business |
Zdroj: | Journal of Banking and Finance Journal of Banking and Finance, Elsevier, 2014, 43 (6), pp.226-246 |
ISSN: | 0378-4266 |
Popis: | International audience; The present study investigates the sources of shareholder wealth gains – as measured by cumulative abnormal returns and premiums – from going private transactions (GPTs). Using data for 314 GPTs from 18 Western European countries, we find that the announcements of GPTs generate a cumulative average abnormal return of about 22% and that pre-transaction shareholders on average receive a raw premium of about 36%. We further find that these shareholder wealth gains increase with the degree of separation of cash-flow and control rights of the pre-transaction ultimate owner and decrease with its ownership interests and with the presence of a second large shareholder. Taken together, these findings support the view that GPTs are expected to mitigate the inefficiencies induced by pre-transaction agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders. Thus, shareholder wealth gains from GPTs reflect the potential additional value that will be created under private ownership. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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