Evaluating public administration approaches towards tax non-compliance in Europe
| Autor: | Colin C. Williams |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Economics
Steuern informal sector undeclared work Staatstätigkeit taxes regression analysis tax co-responsibility Probit model ddc:350 050602 political science & public administration Deterrence theory 050207 economics institutional theory media_common Steuerzahler risk Institutionstheorie Informal sector Public economics Eurobarometer informeller Sektor 05 social sciences tax awareness Wirtschaft 0506 political science confidence social actor theory tax morale Vertrauen penalty Horizontal and vertical public policy tax evasion Eurobarometer 67.3 (May-Jun 2007) ZA5688: Eurobarometer 79.2 (2013) ZA7579: Eurobarometer 92.1 (2019) [undeclared work fiscal justice tax commitment ZA4561] theory of institutions Public policy tax payer Gerechtigkeit 0502 economics and business ddc:330 media_common.cataloged_instance Risiko European Union European union Institutional theory Schwarzarbeit tax fraud Strafe moonlighting Steuerhinterziehung morality General Business Management and Accounting Moral justice lcsh:Political institutions and public administration (General) Öffentliche Finanzen und Finanzwissenschaft Regressionsanalyse Public Finance lcsh:JF20-2112 Business EU |
| Zdroj: | Administrative Sciences Volume 10 Issue 3 Administrative Sciences, Vol 10, Iss 43, p 43 (2020) |
| Popis: | Those engaging in tax non-compliance have been conventionally explained as rational economic actors partaking when the benefits outweigh the costs, and thus public administrations have sought to enforce compliance using a deterrence approach which increases the risk of detection and penalties. However, many have been found to not engage in tax non-compliance when the benefits exceed the costs. The result has been the emergence of a voluntary compliance approach viewing taxpayers as social actors who engage in tax non-compliance when there is a lack of vertical trust (in governments) and horizontal trust (in others). Using a probit regression analysis of data from special Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 2007, 2013 and 2019, the finding is that although the likelihood of participating in tax non-compliance is largely not associated with the level of penalties and risk of detection, it is significantly associated with the level of vertical and horizontal trust, with participation in tax non-compliance increasing with lower vertical and horizontal trust. The implications for theory and for how public administrations tackle tax non-compliance are then discussed. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|