Jointly Held Investment Options and Vertical Relationships
| Autor: | Dimitrios Zormpas |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Economics and Econometrics Bargaining problem business.industry Strategy and Management Postponement 05 social sciences Distribution (economics) Investment (macroeconomics) Time optimal Microeconomics Bargaining power Management of Technology and Innovation 0502 economics and business Real options Economics Investment analysis Nash bargaining Market power 050207 economics Vertical relations business 050203 business & management Downstream (petroleum industry) |
| Zdroj: | Review of Industrial Organization. 58:513-530 |
| ISSN: | 1573-7160 0889-938X |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11151-020-09784-w |
| Popis: | We find the optimal time for exercising a jointly held investment option. When the input market is competitive, the investment can take place earlier, later, or exactly when the optimal investment threshold is reached depending on how the option holders interact and on the bargaining power distribution. When instead the input supplier has market power, the game-theoretic framework downstream is shown to be of secondary importance. The timing effect that is attributed to the vertical relationship is always prevailing, which dictates the inefficient postponement of the investment. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|