Destructive Behavior in a Fragile Public Good Game
| Autor: | Ben Loerakker, Maximilian Hoyer, Nadège Bault, Frans van Winden |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Experimental and Political Economics / CREED (ASE, FEB), Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED), Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA), Cognitive Science Center Amsterdam, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Dao, Taï |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Předmět: |
Level playing field
Economics and Econometrics spite Welfare economics spite destructive behavior public good relationship laboratory experiment Social value orientations Public good laboratory experiment [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Constructive JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments Framing (social sciences) destructive behavior public good Framing (construction) Phenomenon Spite Economics relationship Positive economics Laboratory experiment [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Finance ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods |
| Zdroj: | Economics Letters Economics Letters, Elsevier, 2014, 123 (3), pp. 295-299. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.023⟩ Economics Letters, 2014, 123 (3), pp. 295-299. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.023⟩ Economics Letters, 123(3), 295-299. Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0165-1765 |
| Popis: | Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment - like damaging public goods - is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG) game which puts the opportunity for destructive behavior (taking) on a level playing field with constructive behavior (contributing). We find substantial evidence of destructive decisions, sometimes leading to sour relationships characterized by persistent hurtful behavior. While positive framing induces fewer destructive decisions, shifting the selfish Nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20%. Female subjects are found to be more inclined to use destructive decisions. Finally, subjects’ social value orientation turns out to be partly predictive of (at least initial) destructive choices. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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