A Model of Hospital Congestion with Imperfect Referral System

Autor: Damien Besancenot, Nicolas Sirven, Radu Vranceanu
Přispěvatelé: Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé (LIRAES (URP_ 4470)), Université de Paris (UP), Centre de Recherches sur l'Action Politique en Europe (ARENES), Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Rennes-École des Hautes Études en Santé Publique [EHESP] (EHESP)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), École des Hautes Études en Santé Publique [EHESP] (EHESP), ESSEC Business School and THEMA (UMR 8184), Economics Department, Essec Business School-Essec Business School-Théorie économique, modélisation et applications (THEMA), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-CY Cergy Paris Université (CY)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-CY Cergy Paris Université (CY), Université Paris Cité (UPCité), Université de Rennes (UR)-Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Rennes-École des Hautes Études en Santé Publique [EHESP] (EHESP)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Institut du Management (IDM), ESSEC Business School-Théorie économique, modélisation et applications (THEMA)
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2021
Předmět:
Zdroj: Revue d'Economie Politique
Revue d'Economie Politique, Dalloz, 2021, 131 (6), pp.951-970. ⟨10.3917/redp.316.0131⟩
Revue d'économie politique
Revue d'économie politique, 2021, 131 (6), pp.951-970. ⟨10.3917/redp.316.0131⟩
ISSN: 0373-2630
2105-2883
DOI: 10.3917/redp.316.0131⟩
Popis: International audience; This paper explains the observed hospital congestion by physicians' decision to unconditionally refer patients to hospitals, and explain why such a choice is rational when congestion deteriorates the efficiency of the tirage process at the hospital level. In an imperfect information environment, physicians might refer to top-tier hospitals patients with mild diseases that could be properly addressed by regular hospitals, just to fulfill patients' demand for the best care. Yet, the tirage capability of top-tier hospitals declines if the hospital is subject to congestion, which, in turn, provides incentives to physicians to refer more patients to these hospitals. The model presents two equilibria, one with perfect triage, and another with triage errors and hospital congestion. In this last equilibrium, a higher hospital size raises the likelihood of congestion. Public policies strategies to overcome this issue are discussed. © 2021 Editions Dalloz Sirey. All rights reserved.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz: