How to Write a Memo to Convince a President: Walter Heller, Policy-Advising, and the Kennedy Tax Cut
| Autor: | Beatrice Cherrier |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
History
Persuasion Keynesianism Sociology and Political Science media_common.quotation_subject Kennedy (John F.) Commission lcsh:Social Sciences Political science politique fiscale Public reason media_common réduction d’impôts Personal context Keynesianisme Fiscal policy lcsh:H tax cut Law Tobin (James) Normative Heller (Walter W.) General Economics Econometrics and Finance Discipline fiscal policy |
| Zdroj: | Œconomia, Vol 9, Iss 2, Pp 315-335 (2019) |
| ISSN: | 2269-8450 2113-5207 |
| DOI: | 10.4000/oeconomia.5714 |
| Popis: | Walter Heller’s success in convincing JF Kennedy to pass a “tax cut” when he was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors in the 1960s is often heralded as the poster child for economists’ policy influence, yet also sometimes seen as a lost golden age. The purpose of this paper is to reinvestigate how Heller channeled his expertise into policy, and what lessons he drew on how economists should engage with public reason. The paper first zooms onto the historical “footsteps” of Heller’s CEA tenure: his memos. I show that Heller considered himself as “an educator of presidents,” but that in educating, he was also led to commission some academic work that altered the science he was trying to disseminate. The underlying emphasis, thus, is not just on how economic knowledge affects public reason, but also how public reason shapes economics science. I then analyze how Heller “theorized” his and his colleagues’ practices in the late 1960s, in particular what stance he took on three contentious issues: the place of science and persuasion in advisers’ interaction with their publics, how much normative values are involved in advising, and whether advising should rely on a disciplinary consensus. I conclude that the institutional and personal context of the 1960s entailed a highly personalized vision of advising, at odd with the tool-based vision underlying the subsequent “economicization” of economic policy in the following decades. L’un des exemples les plus donnés pour illustrer l’influence des économistes sur la politique publique est celui de Walter Heller, président du Council of Economic Advisors, qui réussit à convaincre J.F. Kennedy, de mettre en place une réduction d’impôts massive dans les années 1960. Cet article documente la manière dont Heller a transformé son expertise économique en politique publique, et les leçons qu’il en a tirées sur les interactions entre experts et décideurs. Pour ce faire, j’analyse la vision de l’économiste comme éducateur qui se dégage de ses « mémos », et j’explique que ce n’est pas seulement la recherche économique qui nourrissait les débats de politique publique, mais que sa volonté de convaincre le président conduisit Heller à superviser de nouvelles recherches macroéconomiques. J’étudie enfin la place qu’attribuait Heller à la science et à la rhétorique dans les interactions entre les conseillers économiques et leurs publics, l’inévitable dimension normative et l’importance de rechercher et de rendre visible un consensus disciplinaire en économie. Je conclue que cette vision très ‘personnalisée’ du conseil aux décideurs contraste avec les modes technocratiques et anonymes par lesquels les économistes ont plus récemment influencé les politiques publiques. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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