Inefficient Cooperation under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty
| Autor: | Bruttel, Lisa, Güth, Werner, Nithammer, Juri, Orland, Andreas |
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| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
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| Popis: | Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods). CEPA Discussion Papers, 20 |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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