Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments
| Autor: | Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, Jean-Philippe Tropeano |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | EconomiX, Université Paris Nanterre (UPN)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE) |
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: |
Antitrust enforcement
Antitrust Economics and Econometrics Strategy and Management Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) Perspective (graphical) Commitments [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance JEL: K - Law and Economics/K.K2 - Regulation and Business Law/K.K2.K21 - Antitrust Law Legal learning Industrial relations Economics Key (cryptography) Deterrence theory Enforcement JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies/L.L4.L41 - Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information Knowledge and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design Deterrence Law and economics |
| Zdroj: | International Journal of Industrial Organization International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2022, 80, ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102795⟩ |
| ISSN: | 0167-7187 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102795 |
| Popis: | International audience; This paper examines the impact of commitment decisions on the efficiency of antitrust enforcement. We discuss the optimal use of commitments considering past rulings as a source of knowledge to better assess future similar antitrust cases. Our framework combines two key effects: the deterrence of the anticompetitive behavior by the different enforcement regimes, and the dynamic perspective through litigation as a source of learning. We show that if the level of penalty is high enough, the antitrust authorities undervalue the dynamic informational benefit of litigation and tend to over-use commitments. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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