Strategic Partisan Transfers in a Fiscal Federation: Evidence from a New Brazilian Database
| Autor: | Fernanda Ledo Marciniuk, Maurício Soares Bugarin |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Government
Database media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Econometric analysis computer.software_genre 0506 political science Test (assessment) Politics State (polity) 0502 economics and business Situated 050602 political science & public administration Economics Fiscal federalism 050207 economics Governor General Economics Econometrics and Finance computer media_common |
| Zdroj: | BASE-Bielefeld Academic Search Engine |
| DOI: | 10.6084/m9.figshare.11193749 |
| Popis: | This article makes use of a unique database that allows, for the first time, calculating in a precise way the amounts of discretionary transfers from the Brazilian Federal government to municipalities in the period from 1997 to 2012. The new database is used to test the “strategic partisan transfers hypothesis”, which states that mayors from the same party as the president receive higher federal transfers than those from different parties, if the corresponding municipality is situated in a state where the governor is not aligned with the president. In general, the econometric analysis strongly supports the strategic partisan transfers hypothesis. Furthermore, it supports the hypothesis that there is a biannual political transfers cycle in Brazil due to the country's staggered electoral system with elections every other year. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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