On the Difficulty of Budget Allocation in Claims Problems with Indivisible Items and Prices
| Autor: | Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, Ricardo Martínez, Teresa Estañ, Natividad Llorca |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Class (set theory)
021103 operations research Equal treatment of equals Computer science Strategy and Management 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies General Social Sciences General Decision Sciences Indivisible items 02 engineering and technology Pareto efficiency Article Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous) Claims problems Manipulability Management of Technology and Innovation 0502 economics and business Cover (algebra) Non-wastefulness 050207 economics Mathematical economics Axiom Budget allocation |
| Zdroj: | Digibug. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Granada instname Digibug: Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Granada Universidad de Granada (UGR) Group Decision and Negotiation |
| Popis: | First of all, the authors thank the Associate Editor and three anonymous Reviewers for their time to review our paper and also for their for their incisive comments and suggestions which have been very helpful to improve the contents of the paper. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovacion y Universidades (MCIU), the Agencia Estatal de Investigacion (AEI) and the Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER) under the project PGC2018-097965-B-I00 and the Spanish Ministry of Science under Project ECO2017-86245-P, as well as Junta de Andalucia under Projects Grupos PAIDI SEJ426 and project P18-FR-2933. In this paper we study the class of claims problems where the amount to be divided is perfectly divisible and claims are made on indivisible units of several items. Each item has a price, and the available amount falls short to be able to cover all the claims at the given prices. We propose several properties that may be of interest in this particular framework. These properties represent the common principles of fairness, efficiency, and non-manipulability by merging or splitting. Efficiency is our focal principle, which is formalized by means of two axioms: non-wastefulness and Pareto efficiency. We show that some combinations of the properties we consider are compatible, others are not. Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovacion y Universidades (MCIU) Agencia Estatal de Investigacion (AEI) European Commission PGC2018-097965-B-I00 Spanish Government ECO2017-86245-P Junta de Andalucia PAIDI SEJ426 P18-FR-2933 |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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