Incentives and Innovation: A Multitasking Approach

Autor:	Veikko Thiele, Thomas Hellmann
Rok vydání:	2011
Předmět:	jel:O31 Microeconomics jel:J33 Incentive jel:O34 jel:M12 Economics Human multitasking jel:D21 Intellectual property General Economics Econometrics and Finance Stock (geology)
Zdroj:	American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 3:78-128
ISSN:	1945-7685 1945-7669
Popis:	This paper develops a multitask model where employees make choices between their assigned standard tasks, for which the firm has a performance measure and provides incentives, and privately observed innovation opportunities that fall outside of the performance metrics, and require ex post bargaining. If innovations are highly firm specific, firms provide lower-powered incentives for standard tasks to encourage more innovation, yet in equilibrium employees undertake too few innovations. The opposite occurs if innovations are less firm specific. We also investigate the effectiveness of several possibilities to encourage innovation, such as tolerance for failure, stock-based compensation, and the allocation of intellectual property rights. (JEL D21, J33, M12, O31, O34)
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::013e12f463f2d26ae7601cc402906329 https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.3.1.78 Zobrazit plný text záznamu