THE METAPHYSICS OF RESPONSIBLE BELIEVING
| Autor: | David Hunter |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Responsibility
lcsh:Philosophy (General) Philosophy 05 social sciences Agency (philosophy) Inference Metaphysics 06 humanities and the arts Semantic property lcsh:Logic 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Contemporary philosophy Belief Agency Mental state 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences lcsh:BC1-199 Metaphysics of mental states lcsh:B1-5802 Reflection (computer graphics) |
| Zdroj: | Manuscrito, Volume: 41, Issue: 4, Pages: 255-285, Published: 21 SEP 2018 Manuscrito v.41 n.4 2018 Manuscrito Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP Manuscrito, Issue: ahead, Published: 21 SEP 2018 Manuscrito, Iss 0 (2018) |
| ISSN: | 2317-630X 0100-6045 |
| Popis: | Contemporary philosophy of mind has tended to make the believer disappear. In response, Matt Boyle and Pamela Hieronymi have argued that believing is an act or activity, not a mental state. I argue that this response fails to fully critique contemporary accounts of believing. Such accounts assume that (i) states of believing are particulars; (ii) with semantic properties; (iii) that we attend to in reflection and act on in inference; and (iv) with a rich causal life of their own. Together, these assumptions leave no room for the believer in an account of believing. But these assumptions are not entailed by the idea that believing is a mental state. Careful reflection on other kinds of states helps us see how to put the believer back in the heart of our account of believing. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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