Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?
| Autor: | Suzanne Scotchmer, Nancy Gallini |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2001 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Public economics Strategy and Management patents ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Intellectual property intellectual property Intangible property innovation Subject matter Reward system copyrights jel:K3 Incentive jel:L5 Homogeneous Section (archaeology) K3 Management of Technology and Innovation Economics L5 intellectual property patents copyrights innovation K3 L5 Law and economics |
| Zdroj: | Gallini, Nancy; & Scotchmer, Suzanne. (2001). Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?. Department of Economics, UCB. UC Berkeley: Department of Economics, UCB. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9wx2c2hz |
| Popis: | Our objective in this paper is to review what economists have said about incentive schemes to promote R&D, including intellectual property. While we focus on environments in which other forms of protection are not available, we note that other protections can obviate the need for any formal reward system. In Section II, we compare intellectual property to alternative incentive schemes. In Section III we review optimal design issues for intellectual property, especially the question of patent breadth, and in Section IV we turn to the special problems that arise when innovation is cumulative. In Section V, we summarize the arguments for and against intellectual property. We comment on whether the design recommendations of economists can actually be implemented, and argue that IP regimes should be designed so that the subject matter of each one has relatively homogeneous needs for protection. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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