| Popis: |
This paper concerns the purposes of WTO retaliation. There are two most competing purposes of WTO retaliation: inducing compliance and rebalancing. My paper introduces another purpose of retaliation that is reflected in the EC – Hormones dispute: inducing a mutually agreeable solution.In May 2009 the European Union and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) implementing an agreement that promises to end the long-standing dispute on hormone-treated beef. The memorandum sets up three phases in which the European Union would get to maintain its ban on the import of hormone-treated beef, but concurrently would provide a new tariff-free import quota for high-quality beef from the United States. In return, the United States would reduce and terminate its retaliatory measures on certain European Union exports.Accordingly, retaliatory sanctions imposed by the United States would be terminated not because the European Union has removed its inconsistent measures, but because both states have reached and agreed upon a mutually satisfactory settlement. Put differently, retaliation measures imposed by the United States do not induce the withdrawal of the inconsistent measures (compliance) but a mutually agreeable solution. The questions are does the DSU contemplate this purpose? Does this kind of purpose undermine the WTO dispute settlement system?My paper provides four primary arguments to promote the purpose of inducing a mutually agreeable solution: (1) WTO retaliation has multiple purposes; (2) Articles 22.8 and 3.7 of the DSU provide a legal basis for this purpose [inducing a mutually agreeable solution]; (3) this purpose supports the aim of the WTO dispute settlement system stipulated under Article 3.2 of the DSU (security and predictability); and (4) this purpose is the best alternative or option to settle the dispute when the purpose of inducing compliance is not attainable. |
