Detection of Deception Attacks in Supervisory Control Systems Using Bond Graph
| Autor: | Mahdi Ouziala, Mohamed Fezari, Imene Zerdazi |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
021110 strategic
defence & security studies business.industry Computer science media_common.quotation_subject 0211 other engineering and technologies Programmable logic controller Process (computing) ComputerApplications_COMPUTERSINOTHERSYSTEMS 02 engineering and technology Deception Telecommunications network SCADA Supervisory control Control and Systems Engineering Signal Processing 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing business Bond graph Software Computer network Vulnerability (computing) media_common |
| Zdroj: | Automatic Control and Computer Sciences. 54:156-167 |
| ISSN: | 1558-108X 0146-4116 |
| DOI: | 10.3103/s0146411620020091 |
| Popis: | Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems can be subject to cyber-attacks due to their extensive connectivity to information and communication technologies. Those communications are used to connect sensors, actuators, and programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to monitor and control the process. The use of communication networks enlarges the vulnerability of SCADA to cyber-attacks that can drive the system to unsafe states. A variety of approaches in the field of attack detection have been proposed, however they are characterized very expensive, low detection rate or are system specific. One of the powerful cyber-attacks targeting SCADA systems is deception attack, where the attacker can change sensor reading parameters. In this work, we propose a new defense strategy that detects parameter changes generated by deception attacks in the sensor and control part in supervisory control systems. To do so, we use the bond graph (BG) modeling tool. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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