Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts

Autor:	Sarit Weisburd
Rok vydání:	2015
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Accident (fallacy) Actuarial science Moral hazard Insurance policy Instrumental variable Sample (statistics) Percentage point Business Social Sciences (miscellaneous) Insurance coverage
Zdroj:	Review of Economics and Statistics. 97:301-313
ISSN:	1530-9142 0034-6535
Popis:	This paper capitalizes on a unique situation in Israel where car insurance coverage is often distributed as a benefit by employers. In our sample, employer-determined coverage resulted in an average $235 discount in accident costs. Using instrumental variable analysis on data provided by an insurance firm in Israel (2001–2008), we find that each $100 reduction in accident costs results in a 1.7 percentage point increase in the probability of an accident. At an average accident rate of 16.3 percent, this 10 percent increase in auto accidents can be interpreted as the effect of moral hazard on car accidents.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::fdab2afe62446d91c028e27cec22eac1 https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00448 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF