Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement: Permits, tickets, or both?

Autor:	Andrew Samuel, Fabio Mendez, Amy Farmer
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Sociology and Political Science Corruption media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Microeconomics Information asymmetry Action (philosophy) 0502 economics and business Economics Imperfect 050207 economics Enforcement Welfare 050205 econometrics media_common
Zdroj:	Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 67:420-441
ISSN:	1467-9485 0036-9292
Popis:	Economic activity is often regulated through both permits and tickets (subsequent inspections). We study the effectiveness of such policies where corruption and an underground economy make enforcement imperfect. In the theoretical model, asymmetric information justifies regulatory action which is enforced by corruptible bureaucrats. We find that regulation through permits alone is useless when corruption exists, while tickets still offer some benefit. Surprisingly, we also find that a system with both permits and tickets achieves welfare that is higher than that which can be achieved with only tickets—that combining the two mechanisms has an effect that is greater than the “sum of the parts.”
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::fd3c9e280d1e1e5886bf0b2523d9b6b0 https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12242 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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