Does Better Governance Lead to Fewer Punishments: Evidence from Property-Liability Insurers in China

Autor:	Erin P. Lu
Rok vydání:	2016
Předmět:	Actuarial science ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION business.industry Corporate governance 05 social sciences Liability ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Accounting 050201 accounting GeneralLiterature_MISCELLANEOUS ComputingMilieux_MANAGEMENTOFCOMPUTINGANDINFORMATIONSYSTEMS 0502 economics and business Business China General Economics Econometrics and Finance Chief executive officer 050203 business & management
Zdroj:	The Chinese Economy. 49:3-13
ISSN:	1558-0954 1097-1475
DOI:	10.1080/10971475.2016.1114402
Popis:	This article uses a sample of property-liability insurers in China to investigate whether the so-called better governance, characterized by independent directors on the board and the separation of chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman of the board (COB), leads to fewer punishments (for insurer misbehavior) from the insurance regulators. We find weak evidence that independent directors help curb insurer misbehavior and counterbalance CEO influence. The separation of CEO and COB also helps reduce the number of punishments. In general, our findings support the regulators’ suggestions on inclusion of more independent directors and separation of CEO and COB.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::fcfda523325b099b6bc2736135ce63a1 https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2016.1114402 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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