| Popis: |
This chapter provides grounds for thinking that PC is insufficient even as a theory of non-inferential justification. Two primary problems are raised for PC. First, PC needs an account of epistemic defeat. PC includes a “no-defeater” condition. However, it is shown that once one tries to get clear on the nature of defeat and how defeaters work within the framework of PC, it becomes apparent that one needs to appeal to something more than just the comparative strength of various seemings. Second, it is argued that PC falls prey to the problem of reflective awareness. If one reflects on one’s seemings, one’s justification deriving solely from them is destroyed. So, it seems that satisfying some condition other than PC is required for reflective agents to have stable non-inferential justification. It is also shown, however, that an unexpected consequence of the problem of reflective awareness is that PC is not really subject to bootstrapping problems. |
