LIABILITY INCENTIVES FOR REDUCING THE COSTS OF OIL SPILLS

Autor:	Bobbie Lively-Diebold, Paul Ameer, Justin Anand, Gary Yoshioka
Rok vydání:	1995
Předmět:	Statute Finance Government Incentive Public economics business.industry Liability Oil spill Economics business Oil pollution Natural resource
Zdroj:	International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings. 1995:249-254
ISSN:	2169-3358 2169-3366
Popis:	This paper briefly reviews the economics of liability law related to oil pollution and analyzes selected federal statutes and court cases to assess how liability law has evolved over time in terms of creating incentives for potential spillers to reduce the societal cost of oil spills. Based on a review of statutes and judge-made law, it appears that prior to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), the liability provisions of statutes and judge-made law may have failed to provide spillers with sufficient incentives to invest in spill prevention and minimize the societal cost of spills. The OPA liability provisions and judge-made law related to federal government natural resource damage assessment procedures have strengthened the incentive structure by making potential spillers liable for the range of costs of oil spills. However, a sufficient body of judge-made law is not yet available to draw any definitive conclusions about the extent to which the new liability regime created in part by OPA 90 will lead to significantly different outcomes and therefore compel industry to adjust behavior accordingly.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f7bae8ce59620dedf0e7106050fb59c9 https://doi.org/10.7901/2169-3358-1995-1-249 Zobrazit plný text záznamu