| Autor: |
David B. Hershenov |
| Rok vydání: |
2019 |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Ethics, Medicine and Public Health. 10:102-110 |
| ISSN: |
2352-5525 |
| DOI: |
10.1016/j.jemep.2019.100406 |
| Popis: |
Summary Our animal bodies inevitably wear down and we cease to exist. Transhumanists envision that we can prolong our existence by sustaining our mental life without all of the original organic parts of our bodies. This might involve undergoing inorganic part replacements that preserve our psychological functions or uploading the information from our brains and persisting in virtue of that information being physically realized. Transhumanists believe the freshly dead can now be cryogenically preserved until scientific developments make repairs and reanimation or inorganic bodies and brain scanning feasible. Such endeavors typically overlook a difficulty plaguing Lockean accounts of persons which is explaining the relationship of the human person to distinct human animal. Problems arise that can only be avoided by identifying the human person and the human animal. This identification and the recognition that we persist in virtue of earlier states immanently causing later states will undermine attempts of transhumanists to survive the deaths of their animal bodies. The funds allocated for researching how to replace our organic bodies would be better spent on learning how to postpone the deaths of those bodies. |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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Full Text from ScienceDirect