Two Dogmas of Egalitarianism
| Autor: | Douglas B. Rasmussen, Douglas J. Den Uyl |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Journal des Économistes et des Études Humaines. 26 |
| ISSN: | 2153-1552 2194-5799 |
| DOI: | 10.1515/jeeh-2020-0010 |
| Popis: | It is more than clear that in our previous works—Norms of Liberty and The Perfectionist Turn—we are opposing what is generally understood as egalitarianism in political philosophy. Our purpose here is to clarify our opposition by showing that our rejection of egalitarianism cannot be successfully accused of being inconsistent with morality itself. We believe that discussing what we call “two dogmas of egalitarianism” will go some distance in accomplishing that end. These “dogmas” can be stated as follows: (1) The burden of proof for any deviation from equality in ethics rests upon the advocate of inequality; and (2) One's position on the natural equality (or inequality) of human beings requires a similar position in one’s ethical conclusions. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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