Shaping the ground for bilateral cybersecurity negotiations
Autor: | James Andrew Lewis |
---|---|
Rok vydání: | 2021 |
Předmět: | |
Zdroj: | China International Strategy Review. 3:115-122 |
ISSN: | 2524-5635 2524-5627 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s42533-021-00081-z |
Popis: | Cyber issues are important for the bilateral relationship between China and the United States, but there are serious obstacles to reaching agreement on cybersecurity. Meaningful negotiation is not possible in the near term, given China’s disinterest in compromise, except on its own terms, and the unfavorable U.S. position inherited by the Biden Administration. China is unlikely to make concessions and the U.S. is unlikely to accept at face value any concession China might offer to make. Progress is also hampered by the outdated concepts used in bilateral cybersecurity discussions, such as stability, escalation, or deterrence. These terms are inherited from the Cold War and no longer provide a useful conceptual framework or lexicon. The most pressing issues are cyber espionage and political interference using cyber means. The prospects for bilateral agreement on these topics are limited. Both the U.S. and China lack incentives to reach agreement. Perhaps, if there is a time in the future when the U.S. and China both perceived increased risks from continued cyber conflict, that would create the incentives needed to negotiate, but there is little incentive for agreement now. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
Externí odkaz: |