LACO: Lightweight Three-Factor Authentication, Access Control and Ownership Transfer Scheme for E-Health Systems in IoT
| Autor: | Hamid Mala, Seyed Farhad Aghili, Pedro Peris-Lopez, Mohammad Shojafar |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Authentication
Computer Networks and Communications Computer science business.industry 020206 networking & telecommunications Denial-of-service attack Access control Context (language use) 02 engineering and technology Multi-factor authentication Computer security computer.software_genre Hardware and Architecture Authentication protocol 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing business computer Protocol (object-oriented programming) Software AKA |
| Zdroj: | Future Generation Computer Systems. 96:410-424 |
| ISSN: | 0167-739X |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.future.2019.02.020 |
| Popis: | The use of the Internet of Things (IoT) in the electronic health (e-health) management systems brings with it many challenges, including secure communications through insecure radio channels, authentication and key agreement schemes between the entities involved, access control protocols and also schemes for transferring ownership of vital patient information. Besides, the resource-limited sensors in the IoT have real difficulties in achieving this goal. Motivated by these considerations, in this work we propose a new lightweight authentication and ownership transfer protocol for e-health systems in the context of IoT (LACO in short). The goal is to propose a secure and energy-efficient protocol that not only provides authentication and key agreement but also satisfies access control and preserves the privacy of doctors and patients. Moreover, this is the first time that the ownership transfer of users is considered. In the ownership transfer phase of the proposed scheme, the medical server can change the ownership of patient information. In addition, the LACO protocol overcomes the security flaws of recent authentication protocols that were proposed for e-health systems, but are unfortunately vulnerable to traceability, de-synchronization, denial of service (DoS), and insider attacks. To avoid past mistakes, we present formal (i.e., conducted on ProVerif language) and informal security analysis for the LACO protocol. All this ensures that our proposed scheme is secure against the most common attacks in IoT systems. Compared to the predecessor schemes, the LACO protocol is both more efficient and more secure to use in e-health systems. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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