IPv6 Host Address Usage Survey
| Autor: | Nevil Brownlee, Qinwen Hu |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2014 |
| Předmět: |
IPv6 address
SIMPLE (military communications protocol) business.industry Interface (Java) Computer science ComputerSystemsOrganization_COMPUTER-COMMUNICATIONNETWORKS Computer security computer.software_genre IPv6 Zero (linguistics) business computer Host (network) Private network Computer network Vulnerability (computing) |
| Zdroj: | International Journal of Future Computer and Communication. 3:341-345 |
| ISSN: | 2010-3751 |
| DOI: | 10.7763/ijfcc.2014.v3.323 |
| Popis: | It is tempting to assume that for IPv6, with its 64-bit Interface IDs (IIDs), some existing address scanning attacks have become infeasible. RFC 5157 suggests how Interface IDs could be allocated so as to minimize a site's vulnerability to address scans, essentially by using IIDs consisting of a pseudorandom sequence of 1s and 0s. In this paper, we investigate how network administrators are actually allocating their Interface IDs. We have developed and carried out a survey of various IPv6 addresses from 50 countries. We find that few network administrators are using RFC 5157's allocation methods; instead we find that most network administrators are using one of five simple allocation schemes which tend to leave zero bits in large sections of their Interface IDs. We observe that such schemes can leave networks vulnerable to address scanning. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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