Methods of Solving the Theoretic Game Models for Coordinating Interests in Regulating the Fishery Industry
| Autor: | Gennady A. Ougolnitsky, A. I. Sukhinov, A. B. Usov |
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| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Sustainable development
Computer science media_common.quotation_subject 010102 general mathematics Control (management) Differential (mechanical device) 01 natural sciences Phase (combat) 010305 fluids & plasmas Fishery Computational Mathematics Incentive Modeling and Simulation 0103 physical sciences State (computer science) 0101 mathematics Imitation Set (psychology) media_common |
| Zdroj: | Mathematical Models and Computer Simulations. 12:176-184 |
| ISSN: | 2070-0490 2070-0482 |
| Popis: | Dynamic theoretic game models for the coordination of private and social interests of agents in the concept of the sustainable development (SD) of the dynamic system controlled by them are investigated. Within this concept, the hierarchical control mechanisms—methods of administrative control and inducement—are formalized as solutions of hierarchical differential games with the phase constraints reflecting the requirements for the state of the controlled dynamic system providing the conditions for SD. Administrative control involves the impact of the leading player (the subject of managing SD) on the set of admissible controls for the followers (the subject of the impact on the controlled dynamic system); and the incentive, on his payoff function. Mechanisms of administrative and economic management are formalized as computer imitation scenarios. The dynamic models considered in the article are the development of the models for the coordination of private and social interests proposed by Yu.B. Germeyer and I.A. Vatel. Numerical calculations are carried out and a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of these control mechanisms for the fisheries’ model is fulfilled. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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