On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
| Autor: | Agustín G. Bonifacio, Jordi Massó |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Structure (mathematical logic)
Economics and Econometrics Class (set theory) 05 social sciences Semilattice Infimum and supremum Domain (software engineering) Combinatorics Set (abstract data type) Unanimity 0502 economics and business 050206 economic theory 050207 economics Social choice theory Finance Mathematics |
| Zdroj: | Games and Economic Behavior. 124:219-238 |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| Popis: | We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full Text from ScienceDirect