The Electoral Connection and Legislative Committees

Autor:	Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon, Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson, Brian F. Crisp, Mark P. Jones, Bradford S. Jones
Rok vydání:	2009
Předmět:	Politics Incentive Political science Political Science and International Relations Legislature Public administration Law Test (assessment)
Zdroj:	The Journal of Legislative Studies. 15:35-52
ISSN:	1743-9337 1357-2334
DOI:	10.1080/13572330802666786
Popis:	This article examines whether the career needs of legislators – to be re-elected or to move on to another political post – allow us to explain the rules governing committee structures and the committee assignments individual legislators obtain. It uses the institutional variations provided by Argentina, Costa Rica, and Venezuela to test hypotheses about committee assignments and committee assignment mechanisms. It finds that incentives created by candidate selection procedures and electoral rules show some relationship to committee assignments, but with a good deal of variation across national cases and individual careers.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f3a27889074f22ca53f950d98fce39f3 https://doi.org/10.1080/13572330802666786 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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