Deterring threats and settling scores: How coups influence respect for physical integrity rights
| Autor: | Daniel Arnon, Travis B. Curtice |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
021110 strategic
defence & security studies Economics and Econometrics Human rights Physical integrity media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies 02 engineering and technology Affect (psychology) 0506 political science Politics Political science Political economy Political Science and International Relations 050602 political science & public administration Political violence media_common |
| Zdroj: | Conflict Management and Peace Science. 37:655-673 |
| ISSN: | 1549-9219 0738-8942 |
| DOI: | 10.1177/0738894219843240 |
| Popis: | Do coups affect patterns of political violence like violations of physical integrity rights? Do these patterns vary depending on whether coups succeed or fail? We argue that political uncertainty from coups decreases respect for physical integrity rights. Post-coup regimes preemptively repress as a show of strength to deter threats from those excluded from power and settle scores through cycles of retaliation. Additionally, we argue that the retaliation cycle of score settling will last longer after a failed coup because of informational problems that emerge when targeting opponents. Employing data on coups and physical integrity rights from 1980 to 2015, we find coup failure and success to be negatively associated with respect for physical integrity rights, and the cycle of retaliation lasts longer after failed coups. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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