Prejudice is a general evaluation, not a specific emotion
| Autor: | Angela J. Bahns |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Value (ethics)
Physiology Contempt media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 050109 social psychology Context (language use) Emotion work Representation (arts) 050105 experimental psychology Disgust Social group Behavioral Neuroscience Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Psychology Prejudice Social psychology Cognitive psychology media_common |
| Zdroj: | Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 40 |
| ISSN: | 1469-1825 0140-525X |
| DOI: | 10.1017/s0140525x16000674 |
| Popis: | Prejudice, like contempt, is a general evaluation rather than a specific emotion. I explore the idea that emotions and attitudes are conceptually distinct by applying Gervais & Fessler's model to the intergroup context. I argue that prejudice is an affective representation of a social group's relational value (friend or foe) and dispute the idea that there are many distinct prejudices. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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