Linking domestic emissions trading schemes and the evolution of the international climate regime bottom-up support of top-down processes? Introduction to the special issue of MITI
Autor: | Wolfgang Sterk, Ralf Schüle |
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Rok vydání: | 2009 |
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Zdroj: | Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change. 14:375-378 |
ISSN: | 1573-1596 1381-2386 |
Popis: | More and more countries are incorporating emissions trading into their national climate policies. While the European Union (EU), Norway and Switzerland have already launched their emissions trading schemes (ETS), the Japanese Ministry of the Environment has started a small pilot scheme and the Japanese government is now considering the introduction of a full-scale ETS. Also in Canada, Australia and the U.S. domestic emissions trading schemes are being discussed. Simultaneously, in the U.S. individual states are pushing ahead the establishment of sub-national trading schemes. Several authors have pointed out that a linking of emerging domestic cap-and-trade schemes at the entity or installation level would yield benefits for international climate policy at different levels: From an economic point of view, the linking of domestic schemes is supposed to increase the economic efficiency of carbon markets. The inclusion of more participants in an extended emissions trading market entails a greater diversity of sources and more abatement options. This should in turn lead to a more economically efficient allocation of resources towards least-cost abatement measures and thus reduced overall compliance costs (Haites and Mullins 2001; Anger et al. 2006, Anger and Bohringer 2006, Edenhofer et al. 2007; IETA 2007). From a climate policy perspective, there have been three main arguments supporting the linkage of domestic schemes: First, linkings may increase environmental effectiveness of climate policy because enhanced cost-effectiveness of reduction measures might make stricter targets politically acceptable. Linkings may also help to reduce the problem of “leakage”: a uniform price signal will remove the incentive to shift production within the countries participating in the combined trading scheme. Actually, if the same price applies everywhere, the most CO2-efficient companies will gain a competitive advantage Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Change (2009) 14:375–378 DOI 10.1007/s11027-009-9182-9 |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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