Assessment of Theory of Mind in Adults: Beyond False Belief Tasks
| Autor: | Atanu Kumar Dogra, Asmita Karmakar |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Experimental psychology
Cognitive Neuroscience Psychological research 05 social sciences Context (language use) Test theory 050105 experimental psychology 03 medical and health sciences Behavioral Neuroscience Psychiatry and Mental health 0302 clinical medicine Neurology Social cognition Theory of mind 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Neurology (clinical) Construct (philosophy) Psychology 030217 neurology & neurosurgery Biological Psychiatry Social cognitive theory Cognitive psychology |
| Zdroj: | Activitas Nervosa Superior. 61:142-146 |
| ISSN: | 1802-9698 2510-2788 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s41470-019-00028-1 |
| Popis: | Theory of Mind, or the ability to attribute mental states to the self and others, forms the foundation of social cognitive processes or social cognition. Since its conception in 1978, the construct has been enjoying increasing attention from researchers and it has been widely studied in the context of autism spectrum disorder. This paper tries to review the issues surrounding the assessment of the construct. Theory of Mind (ToM) assessment goes almost synonymously with false belief tests. And assessing ToM with false belief tasks did not pose a problem because the construct had traditionally been studied mostly, if not exclusively on children. This paper discusses the danger of testing theory of mind with false belief tasks only and the serious necessity to study the construct in the adult population. The paper also discusses why the construct needs to be assessed in a culture-specific manner, the problems with the existing recent tools that have been developed to measure the construct, the complexity of simulating real social stimuli, and the subtleties around the construct that is to be taken care of while developing assessment measures. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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