Strategic delegation in an experimental mixed duopoly

Autor:	Ninghua Du, Guangliang Ye, John S. Heywood
Rok vydání:	2013
Předmět:	Microeconomics Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management Economics and Econometrics Mixed duopoly media_common.quotation_subject Strategic delegation Economics Welfare Profit (economics) Industrial organization media_common Subgame perfect equilibrium
Zdroj:	Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 87:91-100
ISSN:	0167-2681
DOI:	10.1016/j.jebo.2013.01.006
Popis:	We provide the first experimental test of the consequences of delegation in a mixed duopoly. Such delegation allows a profit maximizing private owner and a welfare maximizing public owner to weight sales in managerial contracts. Theory predicts that such contracts improve welfare. Our evidence indicates that both public and private subject owners do provide a weight on sales consistent with the subgame perfect equilibrium. Critically, however, this emerges in the experiment only when playing with a robot manager and when playing with a human subject manager after the experience of playing with a robot manager.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f23f8347c4b748fe58329cb2d34e758f https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.01.006 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full Text from ScienceDirect