Evaluating Resilience of Gas Pipeline Systems Under Cyber-Physical Attacks
| Autor: | Clifford Neuman, Yatin Wadhawan |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
021110 strategic
defence & security studies Engineering Wireless mesh network business.industry 020209 energy Node (networking) 0211 other engineering and technologies Cyber-physical system 02 engineering and technology Pipeline (software) SCADA Transmission (telecommunications) Shortest path problem 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Resilience (network) business Computer Science::Cryptography and Security Computer network |
| Zdroj: | CPS-SPC@CCS |
| DOI: | 10.1145/2994487.2994488 |
| Popis: | In this research paper, we present a function-based methodology to evaluate the resilience of gas pipeline systems under two different cyber-physical attack scenarios. The first attack scenario is the pressure integrity attack on the natural gas high-pressure transmission pipeline. Through simulations, we have analyzed the cyber attacks that propagate from cyber to the gas pipeline physical domain, the time before which the SCADA system should respond to such attacks, and finally, an attack which prevents the response of the system. We have used the combined results of simulations of a wireless mesh network for remote terminal units and of a gas pipeline simulation to measure the shortest Time to Criticality (TTC) parameter; the time for an event to reach the failure state. The second attack scenario describes how a failure of a cyber node controlling power grid functionality propagates from cyber to power to gas pipeline systems. We formulate this problem using a graph-theoretic approach and quantify the resilience of the networks by percentage of connected nodes and the length of the shortest path between them. The results show that parameters such as TTC, power distribution capacity of the power grid nodes and percentage of the type of cyber nodes compromised, regulate the efficiency and resilience of the power and gas networks. The analysis of such attack scenarios helps the gas pipeline system administrators design attack remediation algorithms and improve the response of the system to an attack. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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