| Popis: |
When the evidence for two hypotheses is unclear, but the rewards for believing them are not, what should we do? Probability theory states we ought to remain agnostic and follow the evidence. However, Blaise Pascal argued that it's practically rational to consider the expected utility of each hypothesis when deciding what to believe. There is evidence adults reason practically rationally, but less is known about how children reason in these situations. We examined the development of practical rationality across three experiments with adults (N = 350) and 4 to 12-year-old children (N = 190). Adults and children were presented with either clear or ambiguous evidence which, under some conditions, yielded a reward. We found that participants followed the evidence when it clearly supported one hypothesis but considered the utility when the evidence was ambiguous. These studies help us understand the development of practical rationality and the origins of Pascal's wager. |
