Soliciting Advice: Active versus Passive Principals
| Autor: | Heikki Rantakari |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Economics and Econometrics business.industry media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Principal (computer security) Public relations Organizational performance Crowds Soft information 0502 economics and business 050206 economic theory Quality (business) 050207 economics Psychology business Law Advice (complexity) media_common |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 32:719-761 |
| ISSN: | 1465-7341 8756-6222 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/jleo/eww002 |
| Popis: | An uninformed principal elicits recommendations from privately informed agents regarding the quality of their projects, and may then further investigate the proposals. Although valuable by itself, the principal’s ability to acquire further information generally crowds out soft information, and may even worsen organizational performance. Further, the impact of further investigations on the precision of soft information is non-monotone. Activist principals are preferred over passive principals if they are always sufficiently involved. Principals that engage in selective involvement are most harmful to the organization (JEL C72, D82, D83). |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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