Nash and Bayes–Nash equilibria in strategic-form games with intransitivities
| Autor: | Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, Richard P. McLean |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Economics and Econometrics 05 social sciences MathematicsofComputing_GENERAL TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Bayes' theorem symbols.namesake Extant taxon Complete information Nash equilibrium 0502 economics and business Economics symbols Behavioral strategy 050206 economic theory Mathematical economics Computer Science::Cryptography and Security 050205 econometrics Public finance |
| Zdroj: | Economic Theory. 68:935-965 |
| ISSN: | 1432-0479 0938-2259 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00199-018-1151-7 |
| Popis: | We study games with intransitive preferences that admit skew-symmetric representations. We introduce the notion of surrogate better-reply security for discontinuous skew-symmetric games and elucidate the relationship between surrogate better-reply security and other security concepts in the literature. We then prove existence of behavioral strategy equilibrium for discontinuous skew-symmetric games of incomplete information (and, in particular, existence of mixed-strategy equilibrium for discontinuous skew-symmetric games of complete information), generalizing extant results. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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