The Importance of Power Balance in Nuclear Arms Negotiations: An Addendum
| Autor: | Casey LaMar |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
International relations
021110 strategic defence & security studies Sociology and Political Science media_common.quotation_subject Comparative case 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies 02 engineering and technology Nuclear weapon Asymmetry 050601 international relations 0506 political science Negotiation Law Political Science and International Relations Arbitration Narrative Sociology Treaty Positive economics media_common |
| Zdroj: | International Negotiation. 22:162-180 |
| ISSN: | 1571-8069 |
| DOI: | 10.1163/15718069-12341351 |
| Popis: | Theorists debate whether symmetry or asymmetry of the power balance can help bring about bargaining success. Arbitration is difficult because the ‘Symmetry Theory’ accepts Structuralist theoretical conventions, while the ‘Asymmetry Theory’ rejects such conventions. This article employs a ‘Nuclear Weapons Addendum’ to strengthen the Asymmetry Theory by allowing it to explain bargaining results in symmetric and asymmetric cases without dismissing Structuralist assumptions. We analyze comparative case studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty to argue that this modified Asymmetry Theory provides a more convincing narrative that should be considered in Structuralist discussions of international negotiation. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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