Good Growth, Bad Growth: How Effective are REITs’ Corporate Watchdogs?
| Autor: | Ruoran Xu, Joseph T. L. Ooi |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
050208 finance Returns to scale business.industry Corporate governance 05 social sciences Institutional investor Monetary economics Economies of scale Urban Studies Accounting Real estate investment trust 0502 economics and business Opportunism Cash flow 050207 economics business Finance Financial services |
| Zdroj: | The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. 57:64-86 |
| ISSN: | 1573-045X 0895-5638 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11146-017-9640-1 |
| Popis: | The rapid growth of REITs over the last two decades raises an old debate on the existence of scale economies. Out of the 874 growth incidents recorded by individual REITs between 1992 and 2012, we observe that 44.5% of them are sub-optimal, that is they resulted in the acquiring REITs operating at decreasing returns to scale. Large REITs with more free cash flows have a higher propensity to engage in bad growth activities. We find evidence that institutional investors play an effective role in discouraging managerial opportunism and empire building. Independent directors and external creditors, however, do not appear to be effective in discouraging REIT managers from making bad growth decisions. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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