Optimal Mechanism Design with Risk-Loving Agents

Autor:	Ger Yang, Evdokia Nikolova, Emmanouil Pountourakis
Rok vydání:	2018
Předmět:	Mechanism design Mathematical optimization Computer science 05 social sciences Optimal mechanism Function (mathematics) Characterization (mathematics) Single item 0502 economics and business Revenue 050207 economics Expected utility hypothesis 050205 econometrics Standard model (cryptography)
Zdroj:	Web and Internet Economics ISBN: 9783030046118 WINE
DOI:	10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_25
Popis:	One of the most celebrated results in mechanism design is Myerson’s characterization of the revenue optimal auction for selling a single item. However, this result relies heavily on the assumption that buyers are indifferent to risk. In this paper we investigate the case where the buyers are risk-loving, i.e. they prefer gambling to being rewarded deterministically. We use the standard model for risk from expected utility theory, where risk-loving behavior is represented by a convex utility function.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ed4a0184ff8c026f4fd9357a899f3e1c https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_25 Zobrazit plný text záznamu