A Provably-Secure Unidirectional Proxy Re-encryption Scheme Without Pairing in the Random Oracle Model
| Autor: | Arinjita Paul, Chandrasekaran Pandurangan, S. Sharmila Deva Selvi |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Theoretical computer science
Computer science business.industry 020206 networking & telecommunications Plaintext Public key infrastructure 02 engineering and technology computer.software_genre Proxy server Proxy re-encryption Random oracle Public-key cryptography Ciphertext 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing business Proxy (statistics) computer |
| Zdroj: | Cryptology and Network Security ISBN: 9783030026400 CANS |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-030-02641-7_21 |
| Popis: | Proxy re-encryption (PRE) enables delegation of decryption rights by entrusting a proxy server with special information, that allows it to transform a ciphertext under one public key into a ciphertext of the same message under a different public key, without learning anything about the underlying plaintext. In Africacrypt 2010, the first PKI-based collusion resistant CCA secure PRE scheme without pairing was proposed in the random oracle model. In this paper, we point out an important weakness in the security proof of the scheme. We also present a collusion-resistant pairing-free unidirectional PRE scheme which meets CCA security under a variant of the computational Diffie-Hellman hardness assumption in the random oracle model. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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