Information Sharing, Holdup, and External Finance: Evidence from Private Firms
| Autor: | Thomas G. Ruchti, Andrew Bird, Stephen A. Karolyi |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Finance
Economics and Econometrics 050208 finance business.industry media_common.quotation_subject Information sharing 05 social sciences Unobservable Competition (economics) Loan Order (exchange) Accounting 0502 economics and business Quality (business) 050207 economics business Private information retrieval media_common Underwriting |
| Zdroj: | The Review of Financial Studies. 32:3075-3104 |
| ISSN: | 1465-7368 0893-9454 |
| Popis: | To mitigate holdup by an informed incumbent lender, a private borrower may publicly share information in order to increase lender competition. Despite proprietary costs, a subset of private borrowers voluntarily share private information in loan and credit underwriting agreements. These borrowers switch lenders at a 16% higher rate and receive lower loan financing costs. For private firms that go public, we analyze changes in the net benefits of information sharing and study the potential estimation bias from unobservable borrower quality. This setting corroborates our inference that voluntary information sharing reduces lender holdup and alleviates financial constraints for private firms. Received May 25, 2017; editorial decision August 8, 2018 by Editor David Denis. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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