Rhetoric, Reality, and Reputation: Do CSR and Political Lobbying Protect Shareholder Wealth against Environmental Lawsuits?
| Autor: | Ralf Zurbruegg, Chee Seng Cheong, Chelsea Liu |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
050208 finance business.industry media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Market reaction Accounting Politics Shareholder 0502 economics and business Rhetoric Corporate social responsibility business 050203 business & management Finance Reputation media_common Valuation (finance) |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 55:679-706 |
| ISSN: | 1756-6916 0022-1090 |
| Popis: | We investigate whether firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) reputations and environmental lobbying efforts protect shareholder wealth in the event of environmental lawsuits. Using a sample of lawsuits filed in United States Federal Courts, we find that firms with superior CSR reputations suffer worse market reactions to environmental allegations. In contrast, lobbying cushions filing-date valuation losses, providing insurance-like protection against lawsuits. Our results are robust to subsample analyses, a falsification test, propensity score matching, and alternative empirical proxies and model specifications. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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