Concession, Contention, and Accountability in Auditor-Client Negotiations

Autor:	Robert J. Ramsay, Jason Bergner, Sean A. Peffer
Rok vydání:	2015
Předmět:	Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management 050208 finance Salience (language) business.industry media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Accounting 050201 accounting Audit Negotiation 0502 economics and business Accountability Quality (business) Business media_common
Zdroj:	Behavioral Research in Accounting. 28:15-25
ISSN:	1558-8009 1050-4753
DOI:	10.2308/bria-51146
Popis:	This study investigates how tactics employed by a client during negotiations impact experienced auditors' propensity to waive material adjustments and whether the salience of a strict concurring partner review affects the decision to waive. Different psychological theories predict that auditors may either become more contentious or more concessionary when facing a contentious client. Our results suggest that auditors are more likely to waive material adjustments when clients use contending tactics, but not concessionary tactics. However, we also find that making a strict concurring partner review salient reduces this propensity. Further, we find that a theory not previously applied to this line of research, the level-of-aspiration theory, may predict how auditors react. These results offer additional insights into auditor-client negotiations and reveal that existing quality controls can influence these negotiations.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ec46005022f9384e5c3e4967e3ee5340 https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-51146 Zobrazit plný text záznamu