Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
| Autor: | Alexander S. Nesterov |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Mathematical optimization Class (set theory) 05 social sciences Characterization (mathematics) Division (mathematics) Upper and lower bounds Object (philosophy) 0502 economics and business Strategy proof 050207 economics Impossibility Mathematical economics Expected utility hypothesis 050205 econometrics Mathematics |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Economic Theory. 170:145-168 |
| ISSN: | 0022-0531 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.004 |
| Popis: | I consider the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are absent and an outside option may exist. I study the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof mechanisms the following efficiency and fairness criteria are mutually incompatible: (1) ex-post efficiency and envy-freeness , (2) ordinal efficiency and weak envy-freeness, and (3) ordinal efficiency and equal division lower bound . Result 1 is the first impossibility result for this setting that uses ex-post efficiency ; results 2 and 3 are more practical than similar results in the literature. In addition, for N = 3 , I give two characterizations of the celebrated random serial dictatorship mechanism: it is the unique strategy-proof , ex-post efficient mechanism that (4) provides agents that have the same ordinal preferences with assignments not dominated by each other ( weak envy-freeness among equals ), or (5) provides agents that have the same cardinal preferences with assignments of equal expected utility ( symmetry ). These results strengthen the characterization by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) ; result 5 implies the impossibility result by Zhou (1990) . |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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