The perfect murder: A philosophical whodunit

Autor:	Jeremy Byrd
Rok vydání:	2007
Předmět:	Philosophy of science Social connectedness media_common.quotation_subject Philosophy General Social Sciences Metaphysics Epistemology Philosophy of language Identity (philosophy) Personal identity Contradiction Moral responsibility media_common
Zdroj:	Synthese. 157:47-58
ISSN:	1573-0964 0039-7857
DOI:	10.1007/s11229-006-0004-2
Popis:	In his Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues from the possibility of cases of fission and/or fusion of persons that one must reject identity as what matters for personal survival. Instead Parfit concludes that what matters is “psychological connectedness and/or continuity with the right kind of cause,” or what he calls an R-relation. In this paper, I argue that, if one accepts Parfit’s conclusion, one must accept that R-relations are what matter for moral responsibility as well. Unfortunately, it seems that accepting that the R-relation is what matters for both survival and moral responsibility leads to a contradiction. My goal, however, is not merely to point out a problem in Parfit’s account. Instead, I believe that once we understand the basic intuitions which lead to this contradiction, it is clear that there is no fully satisfactory way to account for what matters with respect to survival and moral responsibility.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::eb322cac06c100e7bfe711b32d764fe0 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-0004-2 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink