Iudex in Propria Causa: an Historical Excursus
| Autor: | D. E. C. Yale |
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| Rok vydání: | 1974 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | The Cambridge Law Journal. 33:80-96 |
| ISSN: | 1469-2139 0008-1973 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/s0008197300091297 |
| Popis: | That it takes three persons, a plaintiff, a defendant and a judge, to make a case and reach a judgment, was clear to the earliest writers on English law, and implicit in such a proposition was the understanding that a judgment was not properly attainable unless the three persons of the trinity were kept distinct. A fundamental idea of this nature is not, of course, the peculiar property of English law, and being axiomatic it has long been enshrined in the maxim that no one may be judge in his own cause. As might be expected, Coke turned the notion into a phrase. “It is,” he wrote, “a maxim in law aliquis non debet esse iudex in propria causa.” |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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