Law enforcement in a federal system: Endogenous timing of decentralized enforcement effort
| Autor: | Tim Friehe, Cat Lam Pham, Thomas J. Miceli |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
05 social sciences Law enforcement ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Competition (economics) Game structure 0502 economics and business ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDSOCIETY Business Federalism 050207 economics Enforcement Law Finance 050205 econometrics Law and economics |
| Zdroj: | International Review of Law and Economics. 56:134-141 |
| ISSN: | 0144-8188 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.irle.2018.09.002 |
| Popis: | This paper explores how inter-jurisdictional competition in the fight against crime unfolds. Local law enforcement reduces the local level of crime, partly by diverting it elsewhere. We highlight that the commonly considered game structure (i.e., the simultaneous-move game) usually does not arise endogenously, that is, when local law enforcement agencies can choose when to exert effort. This has important implications (e.g., for the equilibrium enforcement levels). |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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